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Abstract. Recommender systems are widely used to predict personal-
ized preferences of goods or services using users’ past activities, such
as item ratings or purchase histories. If collections of such personal ac-
tivities were made publicly available, they could be used to personalize
a diverse range of services, including targeted advertisement or recom-
mendations. However, there would be an accompanying risk of privacy
violations. The pioneering work of Narayanan et al. demonstrated that
even if the identifiers are eliminated, the public release of user ratings
can allow for the identification of users by those who have only a small
amount of data on the users’ past ratings.
In this paper, we assume the following setting. A collector collects user
ratings, then anonymizes and distributes them. A recommender con-
structs a recommender system based on the anonymized ratings provided
by the collector. Based on this setting, we exhaustively list the models of
recommender systems that use anonymized ratings. For each model, we
then present an item-based collaborative filtering algorithm for making
recommendations based on anonymized ratings. Our experimental results
show that an item-based collaborative filtering based on anonymized
ratings can perform better than collaborative filterings based on 5–10
non-anonymized ratings. This surprising result indicates that, in some
settings, privacy protection does not necessarily reduce the usefulness
of recommendations. From experimental analysis of this counterintuitive
result, we observed that the sparsity of the ratings can be reduced by
anonymization and the variance of the prediction can be reduced if k, the
anonymization parameter, is appropriately tuned. In this way, the pre-
dictive performance of recommendations based on anonymized ratings
can be improved in some settings.
Keywords: recommendation, anonymization, privacy, collaborative fil-
tering
1 Introduction
With rapid advances in online services, a huge amount of information describing
users’ personal activities is being collected and stored. Recommender systems
that use records of user activities are widely used in diverse services, includ-
ing e-commerce and information dissemination. On the other hand, records de-
scribing detailed user activities can sometime compromise privacy. For example,
Narayanan et al. have reported an anonymity assessment of a dataset containing
user ratings of movies, which was published as part of a competition for recom-
mendation algorithms [6]. They demonstrated that even if the identifiers (i.e.,
the names of the users) are eliminated from the dataset, the public release of the
dataset can allow for the reidentification of users. For example, 84% of users can
be uniquely reidentified using only their preferences for eight movies that are
not among the top 500 most popular movies. Due to the sparsity of user ratings,
such reidentification can happen even with only a small amount of background
knowledge about a target.
Considering that user ratings for recommendation are always sparse, some
privacy protection is needed when user ratings are released. In this paper, we
consider practical models for making recommendations based on anonymized
ratings. We then introduce recommendation algorithms that fit these models
and achieve a good balance of usefulness and preservation of privacy.
Related Works Recently, there have been two lines of active research con-
cerning the preservation of privacy in recommendation systems. The objective
of one of these lines of study is to preserve the privacy of the user ratings from
the entity who provides the recommendation. Canny has presented a privacy-
preserving recommender system that uses cryptographic tools and assumes that
users communicate with each other over a peer-to-peer network[2]. In this sys-
tem, the ratings are homomorphically encrypted, and then the matrix is com-
pleted without decryption by means of singular value decomposition. Polat et
al. presented a recommendation scheme in which user ratings are randomized
by the users themselves, and the entity that collects the user ratings performs
the recommendations based on the randomized user ratings[10]. Through exper-
iments, they examined the trade-offs between privacy and prediction accuracy in
their recommendation scheme. Parra-Arnau et al. introduced a recommendation
system in which the users can suppress sensitive ratings [8]. They also discussed
the optimal trade-off between the suppression of ratings and privacy, but they
did not explicitly discuss the effect of the privacy protection mechanism on the
prediction accuracy.
In the other main line of research, the objective is to preserve privacy when
releasing user ratings to be used for recommendations. Parameswaran et al. pre-
sented a scheme that first obfuscates the user ratings and then distributes them.
Their obfuscation scheme does not necessarily give a mathematical guarantee
of anonymity, but their experimental results revealed that it does not degrade
the prediction accuracy of the recommendations[7]. Chang et al. proposed an
algorithm that k-anonymizes user ratings and then constructs a recommender
system based on the anonymized ratings. Recognizing that the rating matrices
are sparse, Chang et al.’s idea is to first make the rating matrix dense by com-
plementing it using singular value decomposition, and then to k-anonymize the
resulting matrix[3]. Experimental results with Netflix data show that the loss
of accuracy in the predictions is less with the predictive anonymization scheme
than it is with the regular k-anonymization scheme.
Our Contribution Assume a collector of user ratings distributes k-anonymized
ratings to the public, such as considered in [7] and [3]. The objective of our study
is make a survey of all recommender systems that use anonymized ratings and
then to present item-based collaborative filtering recommendation algorithms for
each of these models. In general, a system that provides recommendations needs
to have some information associated with each of the users in order to personalize
the recommendations. Such information is referred to as the prediction input.
Existing privacy-preserving recommendation algorithms implicitly assume that
the system is able to relate the user who obtains a recommendation to the user
who provided the anonymized ratings; however, this is not always the case in
practice, because there is no guarantee that the ratings of any individual user
are contained in the anonymized rating matrix that the system possesses. Even
if they are contained, the recommender cannot know this.
Considering the above, we will introduce models for providing recommenda-
tions that are based on anonymized rating matrices, and which are determined
by several input parameters that relate the individual who provided the ratings
with the one who obtains the recommendation. We then present a recommen-
dation algorithm for each of these models. In some models, our experimental
results show that the prediction accuracy decreases when there is a strong guar-
antee of anonymity. This indicates that there is a trade-off between anonymity
and utility; this does not contradict the conclusions of [3]. On the other hand,
for some of our models, we found through experiment that the prediction accu-
racy of the recommendations that were based on anonymized ratings were better
than those based on non-anonymized ratings, provided that the non-anonymized
ratings were used as the prediction inputs. This surprising result suggests that
the guarantee of anonymity does not necessarily degrade the utility if the recom-
mendation model is appropriately chosen. Below, we analyze why we obtained
this counterintuitive result.
2 Preliminaries
Recommendation System Let (rui) = R ∈ Rn×m be a sparse rating matrix
of n users and m items, where rui is the rating of user u for item i. We denote
the rating matrix as (r1r2 . . . rn)
T = R, where ru ∈ R
m contains the ratings of
user u. R contains missing values. Where rui has a value in R as Ω, we denote
a set of index pairs (u, i).
Let f : U×I 7→ R be a prediction function of ratings where U = {1, 2, · · · , n}
and I = {1, 2, · · · ,m} denote the sets of user and item identities, respectively.
For (u, i) /∈ Ω, the prediction of the rating is given by rˆui = f(u, i). Similarity-
based collaborative filtering [4,12] and matrix completion via low-rank matrix
approximation [9] are well known as methods for recommender systems. Note
that although our proposal is demonstrated with an item-similarity based col-
laborative filtering system [12], the discussion in this paper is not necessarily
dependent on a specific algorithm. The construction of our method, based on a
low-rank matrix approximation, is presented in a longer version of this paper.
To evaluate the prediction accuracy of the recommender system, we divided
Ω into two disjoint sets: a training set Ωtrain and a test set Ωtest. The set Ωtrain
is used to train the prediction function, and the set Ωtest is used to evaluate
its accuracy at making predictions. In our experiments, the root-mean-square
error (RMSE) evaluated with k-fold cross-validation was used to measure the
prediction accuracy of f .
k-anonymity and k-anonymization of RatingMatrices Let T be a database
with n records. We assume each record contains information associated with a
single individual and consists of the identifier, quasi-identifiers (QIs), and sensi-
tive attribute values. The identifier is a unique key that identifies the individual.
the QIs are user attributes, such as age or gender; the particular combination
of QIs can identify a single individual with high probability. The sensitive at-
tribute values are the other private information. After the identifiers have been
eliminated, T is said to be k-anonymous if, for any combination of the QIs that
appear in T , there exist at least k individuals who have that particular combi-
nation of QIs[13]. A set of records that share the same combination of QIs is
referred to as an equivalence class. Thus, if the size of all the equivalence classes
in T is greater than k, T is k-anonymous.
In a recommendation system, each record contains the rating values asso-
ciated with a particular individual. The rating values are usually interpreted
as sensitive attribute values because they are not user attributes. However, as
already mentioned in the introductory section, in some cases, there is a high
probability that individuals can be uniquely identified by the ratings, particu-
larly when T is sparse. Thus, we regard the rating values as QIs.
Let tu be a record associated with user u. In our setting, a record represents
a rating vector, tu = ru ∈ R
m, and the database table is given as T = {ru}nu=1.
Following the definition of k-anonymity[13], for any rating vector in T , if there
exist at least k − 1 other rating vectors having the same rating values, then the
database is k-anonymous. Let T˜ = {(r˜u, ku)}n
′
u=1 represent the k-anonymized
database of T . Here, r˜u and ku mean that the number of rating vectors r˜u
contained in T is ku. Since T˜ is k-anonymous, ku ≥ k holds for any (r˜u, ku) ∈ T˜ .
Indices 1 ≤ u ≤ n of T and indices 1 ≤ u ≤ n′ of T˜ are referred to as the user
identity and anonymized identity, respectively. The onto mapping from a user
identity to an anonymized identity is defined by σ : U 7→ U ′, where U and U ′ are
the domains of the user identities and the anonymized identities, respectively.
In recommendation systems, the number of items is generally large, which
means that the rating vectors tend to have high dimensionality. Since the number
of combinations of rating values exponentially increases with respect to the num-
ber of items, k-anonymization by means of generalization or suppression would
seriously destroy the nature of the original rating values. For k-anonymization
of high-dimensional numerical values, it is known that clustering or microag-
gregation preserves the utility of the original data. Here is an outline of k-
anonymization by clustering: First, an algorithm clusters the vectors so that
every cluster contains at least k vectors. Then, each vector is replaced with
the prototype of the cluster to which that vector is assigned. Algorithms for k-
anonymization by clustering include the one-pass K-means algorithm (OKA)[5]
and r-gather clustering [1]. The recommendation models introduced in the fol-
lowing sections are not dependent on a specific anonymization method, but we
used the OKA in our experiments.
3 Recommendation Models Based on Anonymized
Ratings
In this section, we survey the available recommendation models that are based
on anonymized ratings and then examine the risks of de-anonymization of the
ratings.
3.1 Stakeholders
We first introduce the four stakeholders that occur in recommendations with
anonymized ratings: the rater, the rating collector, the recommender, and the
user.
The rater is the entity that gives the rating values to the rating collector. The
rating collector (collector for short) is the entity that collects the rating values
from the raters and constructs the sparse rating matrix R. Then, if necessary,
the rating collector anonymizes the rating matrix as R˜ and distributes it to the
recommender. The recommender is the entity that obtains rating matrix R (or
anonymized rating matrix R˜) from the collector and constructs the prediction
function f . Then, upon request, the recommender provides recommendations to
the users.
3.2 Training Input
The rating matrix that the recommender obtains from the collector is called the
training input. Two types of training inputs are considered in our models.
Case 1. Let U and U ′ be the set of raters and users, respectively. We assume
U ′ ⊆ U , as in regular recommendation systems. In this case, the prediction for
any user can be personalized by using the ratings given by the user in the past.
We represent the rating matrix in this case asR+ (Table 1, line 3). If the collector
anonymizes the rating matrix before providing it to the recommender, we call
this Case 1A. In this case, the training input, i.e., the anonymized rating matrix,
is represented as R˜+ (Table 1, line 4).
Case 2. In Case 2, we assume U ∩ U ′ = ∅. That is, none of the users who
wish to obtain recommendations have previously given ratings to the collector.
In this case, the predictions cannot be personalized based on past ratings. This
situation is known as a cold start. The rating matrix in this case is represented
by R− (Table 1, line 5). If the collector provides the anonymized rating matrix
R˜− of R−, the situation is referred to as Case 2A (Table 1, line 6).
If the collector is a company whose customer base is comprehensive (e.g., a
railway or cell phone provider), and the recommender wishes to provide recom-
mendation services based on anonymized ratings purchased from the collector,
then the recommendation system can be modeled with Case 1A. However, if the
ratings are collected from a limited segment of customers and are anonymized
prior to distribution, then the recommendation system can be modeled with Case
2A; this is because the customer bases of the collector and the recommender are
disjoint. Of course, there are intermediate situations between Case 1/1A and
Case 2/2A that can be considered; however, we will not pursue these, because
they can be covered by extensions of the existing models.
3.3 Prediction Input and Models of Recommendation
In order to provide a prediction that is personalized for a particular user, the
recommender needs to have information about the user. This information is
referred to as prediction input. Let ω(u) be the prediction input for user u.
Below, we list possible variations of the prediction inputs. Table 1 summarizes
the relationships between the training input and prediction input for the different
recommendation models.
1. User identity ω(u) = u as prediction input
Regular recommendations based on non-anonymized ratings are modeled
with this prediction input; users provide their identities (Case1/REG). In
Case 2 and Case 2A, user identities are not contained in the training inputs.
In Case 1A, the recommender cannot know the relationship between the
users and the anonymous raters of the training inputs. Thus, in these cases,
user identities cannot be used as prediction input.
2. Anonymous identity ω(u) = σ(u) as prediction input
Note that this prediction input can be used only in Case 1A, because in
Case 2A, we assumed the ratings of users are not contained in the training
input. In Case 1A, if an anonymous identity is given to the recommender
as a prediction input, the prediction is personalized not for the user, but
for the anonymous identity that contains the user. Because the prediction
is personalized for the k or more users that are contained in the anonymous
identity, the effect of personalization can be weakened.
3. User ratings ω(u) = ru as prediction input
In this case, users provide some of the ratings as prediction input. In Cases
1A, 2, and 2A, the recommender cannot connect the prediction inputs with
the raters in the training inputs. However, if a user can independently provide
rating values, aside from the training inputs, the recommender can person-
alize the prediction for the user, based on the ratings provided (Case1A/UR,
Case2/UR, and Case2A/UR). In Case1A/UR and Case2A/UR, the training
inputs that the recommender obtains are anonymized, although the users
provided non-anonymized ratings. If the users put more focus on the predic-
tion accuracy of recommendation than on preserving anonymity, this decision
is reasonable.
Table 1. Recommendation models based on anonymized ratings
training input
prediction input
user id u user ratings ru anonymized id σ(u) ∅
Case 1 R+ Case1/REG — —
Case 1A R˜+ — Case1A/UR Case1A/AI
BASELINECase 2 R
−
— Case2/UR —
Case 2A R˜
−
— Case2A/UR —
4. No prediction input: ω(u) = ∅.
Without prediction input associated with the users, the predictions cannot
be personalized. In this case, the recommender can do nothing but to give
the average ratings of the items (BASELINE).
3.4 Risk of Privacy Leakage
When making recommendations with anonymized ratings, two types of privacy
risks should be considered. In the first case, when the anonymized ratings are
used as the training input, the recommender may try to use the anonymized
rating vectors to identify the raters. In the second case, when the recommender
obtains the prediction input from the users, the recommender may try to use
the vectors to identify the users.
In the first case, the privacy risk is dependent on the guarantee of anonymity
of the training input. If it is k-anonymous, the probability with which the rec-
ommender can identify the rater is at most 1/k.
Next, we consider the risks in the second case. For Case 2A, user ratings are
not contained in the collection for any type of prediction input; there is thus no
risk of reidentification. For Case 1A/AI, the recommender obtains R˜+ as the
training input and the anonymized identity ω(u) = σ(u) as the prediction input.
However, what the recommender can infer from this is no more than what the
recommender could estimate from R˜+ alone. Thus, the probability with which
the recommender can reidentify the rater is again 1/k at most.
On the other hand, for Case1A/UR, if the recommender obtains ω(u) = ru
as the prediction input, the degree of anonymity can be decreased. For example,
suppose the training input is a three-anonymized rating collection and Users
1, 2, and 3 all belong to the same anonymized identity. If the ratings of User
1 r1 are used as the prediction input, the recommender will be able to learn
the anonymized identity to which User 1 belongs. The contribution of User 1
can then be removed from the rating vector σ(1), which is given as the cluster
center of the three users. This means that the guarantee of k-anonymity has
been degraded from k-anonymity to (k − 1)-anonymity.
Note that the anonymity can be degraded even if no information is provided
that is associated with User 2 or 3. For Case1A/UR, in order to guarantee
k-anonymity after the prediction, the collector needs to anonymize the rating
collection with some integer larger than k. In addition, the number of user ratings
that the recommender can obtain needs to be controlled so that the k-anonymity
of the training input is not compromised.
4 Item-similarity Based Collaborative Filtering with
Anonymized Ratings
In this section, we present recommendation algorithms that use ratings anonymized
by item-similarity based collaborative filtering[12,11], using the models derived
in the previous section. All there algorithms use training inputs to construct
groups of similar items prior to generating personalized predictions.
Case1/REG We first introduce item-similarity based collaborative filtering
without anonymization. The similarity of two items was defined to be the Pearson
correlation coefficient of their ratings. Let Ui be the set of users who rate item i.
Then, the average rating of item i and the correlation coefficient between item
i and item j are given by
r∗i =
1
|Ui|
∑
u∈Ui
rui, sij =
∑m
ℓ=1(rℓi − r∗i)(rℓj − r∗j)√∑m
ℓ=1(rℓi − r∗j)
2
√∑m
ℓ=1(rℓj − r∗j)
2
. (1)
With these item similarities, the predicted rating of item i for user u is given
by
f(u, i;ω(u) = u) = r∗i +
∑
ℓ∈Iu
siℓ (ruℓ − r∗ℓ)∑
ℓ∈Iu
|siℓ|
, (2)
where Iu is the set of items rated by user u.
Case2/UR Let u′ be a user who wishes to obtain a recommendation. In the
Case2/UR, the ratings of user u′ are not contained in R−. Since Iu′ = ∅ in this
case, it cannot be predicted by using eq. 2. In order to personalize the predictions,
users provide the ru′ of some of items as the prediction input. Noting that item
similarities can be evaluated independent of users, the prediction for u′ can be
given using ru′ as
f(u′, i;ω(u′) = ru′) = r∗i +
∑
ℓ∈I¯
u′
siℓ (ru′ℓ − r∗ℓ)∑
ℓ∈I¯
u′
|siℓ|
, (3)
where I¯u′ is the set of items rated by user u
′ in ru′ . Here, note that I¯u′ can be
arbitrarily chosen by user u′.
Case1A/UR and Case2A/UR We now describe the algorithm for Case1A/UR.
The item similarities are evaluated from the training input R˜+ = (r˜ui) by
s˜ij =
∑m
ℓ=1(r˜ℓi − r˜∗i)(r˜ℓj − r˜∗j)√∑m
ℓ=1(r˜ℓi − r˜∗i)
2
√∑m
ℓ=1(r˜ℓj − r˜∗j)
2
, (4)
where r˜∗i is the average rating of item i evaluated with R˜+.
Then, the prediction is made using the non-anonymized user ratings given
as prediction inputs by
f(u, i;ω(u) = ru) = r˜∗i +
∑
ℓ∈I¯u
s˜iℓ (ruℓ − r˜∗ℓ)∑
ℓ∈I¯u
|s˜uℓ|
. (5)
Prediction by eq. ?? makes use of the average item ratings and the item simi-
larities estimated from the anonymized rating matrix, whereas the prediction is
made for a particular user. By giving user ratings as prediction inputs, the pre-
diction can be personalized even when the rating matrix has been anonymized.
In the algorithm for Case2A/UR, the similarities can be obtained by using
eq. 4. The predictions can be made with eq. 5 if I¯u is replaced with I¯u′ , as in eq.
3.
Case1A/AI In this case, the similarities can be evaluated by eq. 5. The pre-
diction of the rating of item i for user u becomes
f(u, i;ω(u) = σ(u)) = r˜∗i +
∑
ℓ∈I˜σ(u)
s˜iℓ
(
r˜σ(u)ℓ − r˜∗ℓ
)
∑
ℓ∈I˜σ(u)
|s˜iℓ|
, (6)
where I˜σ(u) is the set of items rated by anonymous identity σ(u) in the anonymized
rating matrix R˜+. Note that predictions made by this equation are personalized
for an anonymous user identity σ(u), not for a particular user u.
BASELINE In the BASELINE model, the recommender does not have any
information that can be used to personalize the prediction. Therefore, the pre-
diction is the average of the anonymized ratings of the specified item: r∗i as
evaluated by eq. 1.
In summary, Case1/REG is equivalent to [12]. Case2/UR is a well-known
extension of Case1/REG for the cold-start setting. Case1A/AI is a model similar
to [10] or [3]. Case1A/UR and Case2A/UR are models that, to the best of our
knowledge, are newly introduced in this paper.
5 Experiments
In this section, we report the results of experiments carried out in order to evalu-
ate the effects of anonymization on the prediction accuracy of recommendations.
For these experiments, we used the MovieLens datasets[11]. The 100k dataset
contains 100,000 ratings of 1682 items given by 943 users. The 1M dataset con-
tains about a million ratings of 3883 items given by 6040 users.
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Fig. 5.1. Change of RMSE w.r.t. k for Case1/REG, Case1/UR, Case1/AI, and the
BASELINE model. Left: 100k data, Right: 1M data.
5.1 Experiments for Case 1 and Case1A
Settings For Case 1 and Case 1A, we assumed that all the users who received
personalized predictions were contained in the set of raters, i.e., U ′ ⊆ U . For
Case1/REG, we uniformly chose 80% of the ratings from R at random and used
them as the training input. The remaining ratings were used for the test data
to evaluate the RMSE.
For Case1A/AI and Case1A/UR, 80% of the ratings from R+ were chosen
uniformly at random, and then these ratings were k-anonymized using the OKA
method[5]; these were used as the training input. The remaining 20% of the
ratings were used as the test data. For Case1A/UR, 20% of the non-anonymized
ratings ru, chosen uniformly at random from the training data, were used for
the prediction. In the experiments, the RMSE of the recommendations with
these models were measured while varying the anonymity parameter as k =
2, 3, . . . , 15.
Results The change of in the RMSE w.r.t. the anonymity parameter k for
Case1/REG, Case1A/UR, Case1A/AI, and the BASELINE are shown in Fig.
5.1 . The RMSEs of Case1/REG are less than those of Case1/AI for all evaluated
values of k. For Case1/AI with a larger k, the anonymous identities contain a
larger number of individuals; this makes the target of the personalization vague,
and the prediction accuracy deteriorates. This indicates that there is a trade-off
between utility and privacy for Case1/AI.
In Case1/UR, the RMSE deteriorates as k increases. However, surprisingly,
Case1A/UR achieves a prediction accuracy that is better than that of Case1/REG
for all evaluated values of k. This behavior is further discussed in Section 5.3.
We must bear in mind that the anonymity in Case1A/UR can be weakened if
the user ratings are given to the recommender as prediction input, as discussed
in Section 3.4. Because the levels of anonymity achieved for Case1A/AI and
Case1A/UR are not equivalent, the RMSE of Case1A/AI and Case1A/UR are
not directly comparable.
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Fig. 5.2. Change of RMSE w.r.t. γ, the number of user ratings used as the prediction
input, for Case 2 and Case 2A. Case2/REG and Case2A/UR for k = 2, 4, and 10, and
the BASELINE are compared. Left: 100k data, Right: 1M data.
For Case 1A/UR, the results are significantly different between the 1M
dataset and the 100k dataset. With the 1M data, the RMSE slightly improves
(decreases) as k increases in the range of 2 ≤ k ≤ 5, then the RMSE increases as
k increases in the range of 5 < k ≤ 15. This behavior is further discussed (and
further experimental results are presented) in Section 5.3.
5.2 Experiments for Case 2 and Case 2A
Settings For Case 2 and Case 2A, we assumed a cold start; none of the users
who received personalized predictions were contained in the set of raters, i.e.,
U ′ ∩U = ∅. In Case2/UR, we uniformly chose 80% of the users in U at random,
and their ratings were used as the training inputs. The ratings of the rest of
the users were used for the test data to evaluate the RMSE. For the remaining
20% of the users, γ ratings were used as their prediction inputs and the rest
of ratings were used as the test data to evaluate the RMSE. To evaluate the
RMSE, 20 γ ratings were chosen uniformly at random to be used as prediction
inputs; the RMSE averaged over these 20 trials was used as the RMSE. In these
experiments, the number of ratings used as the prediction inputs, γ, was varied
from 1 to 20; the anonymity parameter was set to k = 2, 4, 10. With these
settings, we compared the changes in the RMSE for the BASELINE and the
Case2/UR and Case2A/UR models w.r.t. γ.
Results Figure 5.2 shows the changes in the RMSE of the BASELINE, Case2/REG,
and Case2A/UR w.r.t. γ. Case2A/UR had a better the prediction accuracy than
did Case2/UR, for all values of k and γ. From these results, we can see that item-
similarity matrices evaluated with anonymized ratings gave better predictions
for both Case 1A/UR and Case 2A/UR. Furthermore, we can see that the RM-
SEs are not greatly affected by the degree of anonymity k for Case2A/UR. Thus,
if k ≤ 10, anonymization of the ratings does not damage the recommendations.
Another important observation is that the RMSE improves as γ, the number
of ratings used in the prediction input, increases. This is because the prediction
can be better personalized when there are more user ratings used as prediction
inputs. The RMSE of Case2A/UR is better than that of the BASELINE when
γ≥ 6 in the 1M dataset and γ>≥ 8 in the 100k dataset. Thus, a practical solution
for giving recommendations with anonymized ratings is for the users to rate only
a very small number out of thousands of items. Note that the ratings used for
the prediction inputs can be arbitrarily chosen by the users. If the users provide
ratings of popular items that are rated by a large number of users, any privacy
leakage caused by giving prediction inputs to the recommender can be ignored.
5.3 Analysis of Similarity Matrix Evaluated with Anonymized
Ratings
From the experimental results in the previous subsections, we observe that the
prediction accuracy of recommendations based on anonymized ratings can be
better than those based on non-anonymized ratings in some settings; thus con-
tradicts our intuition. In this subsection, we discuss the reasons of these useful
but counterintuitive results.
The ratings matrices used for the recommendations are usually quite sparse.
In the Movielens dataset, the sparsity is 6.3% in the 100k dataset and 4.2% in the
1M dataset. In our experiments, clustering (OKA) was used for anonymization,
and the anonymized user ratings were set to the average of the user ratings
that belonged to the identical anonymous identities. If some but not all users
who belonged to an anonymous identity rated an item, when the ratings were
anonymized, the ratings of all members of the identity were set to the average
rating of those users who did rate the item. Because of this manipulation, as
k increases, a larger number of unrated elements were complemented with the
average ratings. Thus, the anonymized rating matrix became denser. On the
one hand, if the rating matrix became denser because k was larger, the item
similarities can be estimated with a larger number of ratings, and this might
make the estimation of the similarities more precise. On the other hand, when k is
larger, the number of users contained in a single anonymous identity also becomes
larger. Thus, from the perspective of the users, the ratings of the anonymized
identity do not accurately reflect their individual ratings, and this might cause
the prediction accuracy to deteriorate. Thus, there exists a dilemma in setting
the value of k.
When recommendations are based on item similarities, predictions are made
based on the average ratings of the items and the average of the user ratings
weighted by the item similarities. In order to see how k affects the prediction
accuracy, we examined the behaviors of the average ratings of the items and the
item similarities w.r.t. changes in k.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the changes in the item ratings eavg =
1
|M|
∑M
i=1 |r∗i −
r˜∗i|. In both the 100k dataset and the 1M dataset, eavg becomes larger as k
becomes larger; however, the absolute value of the error is kept within 0.01: the
anonymity degree k does not greatly affect the average ratings of the items.
Figure 5.3(b) shows the histogram of the item similarities s˜ij with different k
values. From the figure, we can see that the positive similarities frequently appear
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Fig. 5.3. (a) Change of eave, the difference between the average ratings of items in R
and R˜, w.r.t. k; (b) Histogram of s˜ij ; (c) Change of evar, the variance of the difference
between rating rij and the predicted rating rˆij , w.r.t. k.
in the non-anonymized item-similarity matrix, while the negative similarities do
not. This tendency changes with larger k. More precisely, by complementing the
sparse rating matrix by anonymization with larger k, the frequency of negative
similarities increases, whereas that of the positive similarities does not change.
The estimation of item similarities between two items by using eq. ?? becomes
more accurate as the number of users who rate both of the items increases.
Thus, the results shown in Fig. 5.3(b) indicate that anonymization enhances the
evaluation of the item similarities between items that are not similar to each
other. We should bear in mind that the similarity estimation with anonymized
rating matrices does not necessarily provide “better” similarities compared to
those estimated with non-anonymized rating matrices.
Finally, we consider the change in the variance of the prediction: evar =
|rui − rˆui| w.r.t. k, where rˆui is the prediction of the rating of item i for user
u. In Fig. 5.3(c), the changes of variance evar are shown for the BASELINE,
Case1/REG, Case1A/UR, and Case1A/AI.
For Case1/AI, the variance increases with k. The prediction for Case1/AI
is personalized w.r.t. the anonymous identities. In this situation, the prediction
might not be appropriately personalized when k is large, because the number of
users per anonymized identity also becomes large.
For Case1/UR, the variance decreases from k = 2 to 5, then it increases. Note
that the variances for Case1/UR are never larger than those for Case1/REG.
For Case1/UR and Case1/REG, the user ratings used for prediction are the
same, and only the similarities are different. Thus, these results indicate that
the item similarities obtained from anonymized ratings are more robust than
those obtained from non-anonymized ratings. For Case1/UR, when k = 4, these
are in balance and the best prediction accuracy is achieved.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered recommender systems that used anonymized rat-
ings and with various types of input for training the recommendation func-
tion and for personalization of the prediction. Then, based on these models, we
presented item-based collaborative filtering algorithms for providing recommen-
dations. Our experimental results show that item-based collaborative filtering
performs better with anonymized ratings than with non-anonymized ratings,
when the users show 5–10 (non-anonymized) ratings to the recommender. This
surprising result indicates that privacy protection does not necessarily degrade
the usefulness of recommendations. From analysis of this counterintuitive result
with experiments, we observed that the sparsity of the ratings can be reduced
by anonymization, and the variance of the prediction can be reduced if k, the
anonymization parameter, is appropriately tuned. Because of these effects, the
predictive performance of the recommendation with anonymized ratings can be
improved. Our future work is to expand our models to other recommendation
algorithms, including matrix factorization.
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